



Why is it so difficult to learn from accidents?

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INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON NUCLEAR SAFETY:
FROM ACCIDENT MITIGATION TO RESILIENT SOCIETY FACING EXTREME SITUATIONS

SESSION 3: BARRIERS AGAINST TRANSITION INTO RESILIENCE

3:30PM - 6:00PM, MARCH 23, 2015


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Unsatisfying learning from Fukushima

- ▶ Importance of learning from the disaster
 - > well-shared
 - ▶ 4 major accident investigation commissions after the Fukushima
- ▶ However, the deficits of nuclear risk governance in Japan are still remained or even getting worse (e.g. Taniguchi 2014)
- ▶ What is the barrier that prevent proactive learning?

Post-Fukushima investigation

- ▶ Paradigm: tradition in the US (Kemeny, Rodgers...)
- ▶ Swift response for official investigation since March 2011
- ▶ 4 major commissions: ICANPS (Governmental), NAIIC (National Diets'), TEPCO's and "Independent" (a NPO's)
 - ▶ All final reports published by the mid 2012
 - ▶ (after that, AESJ established another commission)



After the investigations...

- ▶ Regulatory reform -> establishment of NRA (new reg. body)
 - ▶ Legislation BEFORE the final reports
- ▶ Remained or even worsen governance deficits after the reform
 - ▶ Independent or isolated? -> mutual distrust among stakeholders and public skepticism
 - ▶ Seemingly stringent regulation -> endless "safety upgrade" investments

After the investigations...

- ▶ Criminal prosecution in response to critical conclusions of the final investigation reports
 - ▶ abandoned once, now challenged
- ▶ Unrecovered public support to nuclear program
 - ▶ Polarized disputes between pros and cons
 - ▶ Public opinion maintains negative against nuclear
 - ▶ Slowdown of NPP restart program

Untaken responsibility

- ▶ Unsettled public outrage against unjust situation
 - ▶ Untaken responsibility: conflict with the tradition of retributivism and martinetism
 - ▶ Abandoned prosecution, no punishment, no formal apology and compensation by the Government...
 - ▶ Victims are still suffered, on the other hand
- ▶ No reasonable resolution through the existing legal process

Accident investigation as prosecution

- ▶ Responsible actors were condemned by the investigation reports, instead of the Bar
 - ▶ Strong blaming narratives, especially in NAIIC report
 - ▶ With eye-catching rhetoric: “manmade” disaster, “Made in Japan” accident, “regulatory captured” nuclear village...
 - ▶ Without careful considerations of evidence and causal relationships

Reformed regulation as sanction

- ▶ Nuclear Gullivers vanquished by “more stringent” regulatory measures
 - ▶ NRA’s “World’s most stringent regulatory standards” (PM Abe)
 - ▶ Nuclear operators have been chased by back-to-back increased regulatory requirements
 - ▶ Prolongation of de facto nuclear phase-out

East-Asian local issue?

- ▶ Strong conflict between investigation and prosecution
 - ▶ Considered as “local” and “cultural” deviance to be redressed
- ▶ However, is it still the case?
 - ▶ Increased influence of human-factors in contemporary socio-technical failures
 - ▶ Accident (disaster) - damage and victim - human factors - social justice
- ▶ Poor handling of this issue must undermine “resilience” of society

Another implication of “manmade” disaster

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- ▶ Re-emergence of issues centering on social justice
 - ▶ Perfunctory decoupling of investigation and prosecution no longer works
- ▶ Distribution of authority and responsibility should be discussed and agreed by stakeholders in advance
 - ▶ Upstream public engagement is the key
 - ▶ “Communication” not to convince, but to think together and to reach consensus

IRGC Risk Governance Framework (IRGC 2005)

Reconsider
“risk governance” &
“risk communication”

- ▶ Upstream public engagement is the key
 - ▶ “Pre-Assessment”
 - ▶ “Concern Assessment”
 - ▶ “Risk Characterization”
- ▶ “Communication” is the core element of the risk governance framework as a whole

